

The Azerbaijani-Armenian Conflict Over The Karabakh Region And The International Position On It (1988-1994).

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Abstract:

The Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over the Karabakh region constituted one of the important problems in Asia. The conflict broke out between two newly independent states that did not possess the components of modern states that would support them in that conflict. They were suffering from clear economic and political problems, so that conflict constituted a stumbling block to the economic development of the two countries during That period, and the conflict posed a great danger to the region because it was based on religious foundations and foundations, but that conflict did not begin in the years of its outbreak in 1988, but rather since the 1920s, when the Soviet Union annexed the Karabakh region to Azerbaijan, and rejected any level for the conflict or giving the right to decide. The fate of the Armenians in Karabakh belongs to the people, even though they constitute the majority compared to the Muslims.

The conflict broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1988 and reached its peak after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, as the two countries entered into an open war that continued until 1994, when Russia succeeded in bringing together the conflict, declaring a ceasefire, and deploying United Nations forces in the region, but that did not end the conflict. A final picture. Indeed, this conflict has continued to exist until today, and the possibility of it erupting at any moment exists.

Introduction:

Newly independent states are accompanied by several problems, especially at the level of demarcating borders or determining the fate of regions with common minorities. One of these problems was the Karabakh problem between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Although the conflict over the region took on political and religious dimensions, its roots were not confined to years of direct military conflict, but rather go back For the twenties of the twentieth century, the conflict between the two countries continued to spread undeclared due to the Soviet Union's control over the supreme politics of the two countries and preventing the outbreak of war between them, and this continued until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, so this problem emerged as a case of military conflict between the two countries in which thousands of innocents were killed. Until the major powers within the United Nations were able to intervene to end the conflict and declare a ceasefire in 1994.

Despite that announcement, the conflict still exists today, and the possibility of a war erupting between the two parties also still exists. Therefore, the importance of the topic lies in the fact that it is one of the live and new topics on the scene of Iraqi scientific research, and that the problem of the conflict is still capable of erupting at any moment and the possibility of it turning into an international issue at any time. when .

The research was divided into an introduction, three sections, and a conclusion. The introduction explained the method of constructing the research and the structure of its discussions. The first section pointed to the roots of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Karabakh during the era of Soviet control, and in it we referred to the most important decisions taken by the Union to announce the region's accession to either of the two states and the position of the two governments. So . The

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second section dealt with the situation of the military conflict that occurred between the Azerbaijani forces and the Karabakh forces, unofficially supported by Armenia, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the two countries' declaration of complete independence. The problem of the fate of the Karabakh region emerged as one of the most important outstanding problems between the two countries, and this crisis led to war. An open conflict between the two sides lasted for four years, interspersed with cases of violence and ethnic and religious cleansing. The third topic shed light on international efforts to resolve the crisis. It touched on the role of the United Nations and the positions of the United States, Russia, Turkey and Iran regarding that conflict, and the important role of both Russia and the United Nations in stopping military operations and declaring a ceasefire. As for the conclusion, it contains the most important results that the research concluded.

The first section: the historical background of the conflict 1921-1988

Geography

Nagoro-Karabakh is an enclave with an area of about 4,400 km², and it covers the southeastern part of the Caucasus. Its population as of 1989 was about 189 thousand people, and it is divided between Azeris and Armenians, as Armenians constitute the largest percentage in it, as their number is about 146 thousand people, or about 77%. As for the Azerbaijanis, their number is 40 thousand people, representing 21%, and it also includes Kurds and other minorities, representing 2%. It is a mountainous region devoid of natural resources, and they live on agriculture, grazing, and mining crafts.

Nagoro-Karabakh means in the Russian language (high places), and in Armenian it is called Artsakh, and the Armenians consider it one of their oldest kingdoms in the region. Their sources indicate that the Armenian border used to pass through it as far as the Kura River, and thus the region is an authentic part of Armenia. After the division of Armenia between Byzantium and Persia (387 AD), the lands beyond the Eastern Caucasus, including Artsakh, were annexed to Persia. However, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Kingdoms of Artsakh presided over the liberation battles against the Persians and Turks, and in parallel with the armed battles, the Kingdoms of Artsakh sent messengers on their behalf. To Europe and Russia with the aim of obtaining support from the Christian West, where they were exchanging letters with the Russian Tsars (Peter I and Paul I). Therefore, after the outbreak of the Persian-Russian War, which ended with the signing of the Treaty of Golestan in 1813, the Russian Tsars insisted on re-annexing the regions of the Eastern Caucasus. Therefore, under that treaty, the Persians abandoned almost all the kingdoms of the Eastern Caucasus, including the Karabakh region, and based on the tsarist order issued in 1867 AD, all regions of the Caucasus were divided into five provinces: Kutaisi, Tiflis, Yerevan, Yelizabetpol and Baku. As for Karabakh, it was included in the Yelizabetpol District, and these administrative divisions remained with some changes until 1918 AD.¹

After the October Revolution in Russia, the Karabakh government declared, during the period (May 1918 - April 1920), its complete independence from any other control, and that they had the right to control their politics, councils, and military forces, but the Russians rejected that independence, especially after Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the Soviet Union. Officially, the Soviet Union worked hard to reunify the regions and prevent any popular or official demands for secession. The regions with an ethnic majority were looking forward to self-determination, and this was not limited to Karabakh only, but also extended to other regions within the borders of Azerbaijan. The Shamakhi region (120 km north of the Azerbaijani capital) Baku), the majority of whose population were Turkish Muslims, demanded independence from Azerbaijan and refused to join the new union, but the matter did not satisfy Russian ambitions, so the Russians marched to them with a military force in 1918, the majority of which consisted of Armenian soldiers. They stormed the city and the forces committed terrible crimes against the population, and took These operations had a revenge nature in dealing with the population, and were a case of retaliation for the Ottoman massacres against the Armenians, as some of its residents staged a sit-in at the city's Grand Mosque, but the Russian forces burned the mosque with its children, women, and elderly people in it, so the entire area was subjected to Russian power and entered into the new Soviet state.²

The mutual mistrust between the Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples was due to a major obstacle, which was the failure to resolve the issue of the conflict between the two countries over the Karabakh region. The conflict expanded from a state of military war, then hostile media, down to the popular stories. Generations grew up on this negative propaganda between them, and it was rooted deep in memory. The two historical peoples even became part of the national identity of both countries.

The problem of the conflict dates back to the end of World War I, when the Caucasus was integrated into the Soviet Empire between the years (1920-1921), which included Azerbaijan in April 1920 and Armenia in December of the same year, but that annexation did not depend on the demarcation of the borders between the republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The Karabakh problem remains one of the dangerous problems outstanding between the two countries. Before annexing Armenia, in July 1920, the Soviet Union annexed Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan on the condition of granting it autonomy. The Soviet Union did this for the purpose of settling the issue of border demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan and ensuring the integration of the region within the borders of the state. New Soviet.³

Political circumstances changed, especially after Armenia joined the Soviet Union. That period was characterized by a political struggle for the integration of Karabakh into one of the two countries (Armenia or Azerbaijan) within the Soviet Union, but that was not an easy matter, as it took three years from the time of the Soviet leadership until the issue was settled. . At first, the balance tilted in favor of Armenia. On July 4, 1920, the Kavburo meeting (the Caucasian section of the Soviet Communist Party) voted in the presence of Stalin to include Karabakh in the Armenian Republic. However, in December 1920, the Revolutionary Committee of Soviet Azerbaijan issued a statement rejecting that annexation and condemning the decision. The Kavburo meeting announced by Stalin (the then Nationalities Commissioner) on December 2, 1920.

The Azerbaijani leader Neriman Narimanov protested against the Soviet decision, and a report from the security services reached Lenin indicating that the Armenian Dashnaks party was trying to link Karabakh with Armenia and that it was best for the Soviet Union for Karabakh to remain within Azerbaijani sovereignty while granting it autonomy. Then Lenin agreed to return Karabakh was merged with Azerbaijan, which prompted Al-Kavburo to rescind its decision and agreed to keep Karabakh in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.

On March 16, 1921, a treaty was concluded between the Republics of Turkey and the Soviet Union, known as the Turkish-Russian Friendship Treaty. Among its provisions was that the two disputed regions (Karabakh and Nakhichevan) be under the authority of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and that the Zangezur region be kept under Armenian control.

During 1922, discussions took place about what the status of Karabakh would be within the Azerbaijan SSR. Ultimately, a decision was made to grant the region the rank of an autonomous region, and a decree was issued from Baku on July 7, 1923, declaring Karabakh an autonomous region of Azerbaijan. In 1924, Nakhichevan officially obtained the status of an Autonomous Republic (NASSR).²

A month later, the capital of Karabakh was moved from Shusha to Khankendi, ten kilometers to the east, and the city's name was changed to Stepanakert.

It appears as if this development was a concession on the part of the Soviets to the newly founded Turkish Republic. The Bolsheviks were initially favorably disposed to Kemal Ataturk, whom they saw as an important ally at the time. The Soviet leadership would have preferred to have an important ally like Turkey to benefit from in Any military confrontation with the West. Ataturk was also hostile to any regional arrangements in favor of Armenia The Soviet-Armenian relationship was marred by great complexity linked to the Armenian massacres at the hands of the Ottoman Empire and the refusal of the modern Turkish state to acknowledge those massacres, as this generated a large gap in the relationship between the two countries. Turkey's early bias in favor of Azerbaijan regarding Karabakh also reinforced the expansion of that gap and increased mutual mistrust between them. Both parties. The presence of a strong Armenia could also support the Kurds' demand for the establishment of their state promised by the Sèvres Agreement, which the Turkish government strongly opposes. Therefore, keeping Armenia weak is one way to ensure the territorial integrity of the nascent Turkish Republic.

We can take into account Stalin's tendency to divide the Caucasian peoples in order to prevent united resistance, so he welcomed the idea of separating the Armenians into two entities - the Republic of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, Stalin succeeded in dividing not only the Armenians but also the Azerbaijani power, dividing it into the Republic of Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan (although the latter remained part of the Azerbaijan SSR in administrative terms). There may have been another reason why the Soviet government preferred to annex these regions to Azerbaijan, as the latter had greatly welcomed the Bolshevik ideology in the Caucasus, while Armenia did not show any prominent communist tendencies in the years of revolution and civil war. In Armenia, the Dashnak Party was the dominant political grouping during that period. Far from being oriented toward socialist ideas, it was a militant Armenian nationalist movement. This is clearly proven by the Dashnaks remaining in Zangazor in 1921, where they rejected Bolshevik supremacy, while Yerevan had already come under Communist rule. By contrast, there was clear popular support for Bolshevik ideology in Azerbaijan. Therefore, this Soviet action benefited the Soviet leadership in two ways: the first was to gain the affection of and accommodate the Turkish leadership, and the second was to control the minorities in Azerbaijan and Armenia through what is called "dividing identities" or the policy of divide and rule. In 1966, the Secretariat of the Central Committee took a decision to authorize the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan to discuss the problem jointly, but those discussions did not lead the two parties to any result because of their insistence on merging Karabakh with one of the two states. In 1977 AD, when the new draft constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was discussed, the issue of Karabakh was again raised, but the problem also remained unresolved.

The Karabakh region remained under the authority of the Azerbaijani government throughout the duration of the Soviet existence, as the Constitution of the Soviet Union of 1936, and the amended Constitution of the Soviet Republics of 1977, approved under Article 87, that the Nagorno-Karabakh region is an autonomous region within the borders of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan.

The Armenian powers have since continually tried to reverse this situation, especially in times of change in Soviet policy. Armenian demands emerged again in the late 1980s, as Mikhail Gorbachev's policy allowed for greater openness in the political atmosphere of the Soviet Union. Thus, the number of separate incidents between religious sects in Karabakh increased from 1987 onwards.³

The Armenians refused to keep Karabakh under Azeri control. In August 1987, the Armenian Academy of Sciences submitted a request to the Soviet government bearing the signatures of hundreds of thousands of Armenians to transfer Karabakh and Nakhichevan to Armenia, but the request was not responded to.

The second section: The development of events in Karabakh and the position of the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments towards them (1988-1994).

This division resulted in 70 years of fragile coexistence between the Azerbaijani and Armenian populations in the Karabakh region, and they lived behind the façade of an imaginary peace between two religiously, culturally and historically opposing countries. However, the ruling communist power stood in the way of any kind of conflict erupting in that region, but when the Soviet Union began... With the disintegration at the end of the 1980s, Armenian-Azerbaijani tension appeared on the scene in a clear way.⁴

Events reached their peak in February 1988, when Karabakh officials and the Karabakh Soviet Council formally asked the authorities in Moscow to place them under the control of the Armenian Republic, and reinforced their request with massive demonstrations in the capital of Karabakh (Stepakirt), demanding that the Soviets agree to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia, at the same time. Armenia supported the request by holding huge demonstrations in an attempt to win and unify the Armenians in Karabakh. It was able to mobilize nearly a million people in the streets of the capital, Yerevan, to demonstrate and demand the return of Karabakh. At the same time, the Azeris in Armenia faced increasing difficulties and harassment that amounted to the use of violence against them. At the end of December 1988, the first wave of Azerbaijani refugees arrived in Baku, and most of them were transferred to the Sumgait area in the industrial suburb of Baku. Before the end of February, there were two additional waves of refugees arriving in Baku.⁵

It was expected that the conflict would erupt in a full-scale way on February 27, 1988, when violent riots broke out in Karabakh. The violence was characterized by individual attacks almost every night, targeting personal property (such as hitting and destroying cars), killing livestock, as well as some violence against people. Radio Azerbaijan announced the killing of two young Azeris in Karabakh. Thus, the Azerbaijanis began to take revenge on the Armenians in Azerbaijan, and the ethnic conflict between them intensified, but the Azerbaijani government tried to contain the situation by reducing the importance of what happened, as it stated that... "There is no more place for retaliatory violence than in the Baku industrial zone," and it worked to settle large numbers of angry and frustrated Azerbaijani refugees. Official figures showed that 32 deaths (26 Armenians and 6 Azerbaijanis) were killed during the three days (27-29) in February. While the Soviet army and the forces of the Ministry of the Interior did not intervene in the region to end the escalating state of violence, the army was standing and watching these massacres without intervening, and the writer Igor Nolin had pointed out in his article to this, saying, "The Soviet forces did not intervene to prevent bloodshed, but they sought to prevent He deliberately created a conflict between religious communities in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the Soviet media contributed to inflaming the situation by publishing exaggerated provocative statements about the events on both sides, and deployed criminals from Soviet prisons in Sumgait to carry out the massacre, and the Russians' goal was apparently to destabilize In the region by creating a war between the sects that would weaken the two governments and enable Moscow to regain control of the region, but they were because they did not know what kind of monsters they were creating. It is just like a child who plays with fire and quickly loses control of what he started...".

Soon the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict intensified and mutual hatred escalated to the point that any spark would start a conflict. Any spark would make the process of escalation of ethnic conflict irreversible.

For Armenians, Sumgait was a reminder of the massacres of World War I, and they linked the actions of the Azeris to those of the Ottoman army. This made them more firm in their belief that there was no way they could live in any way with the "new Turks" - as they put it -. From this point, the Armenians systematically expelled all Azeris from Armenia, particularly from the Ararat region where those groups lived in large numbers.⁶

Thereafter, inter-communal violence rapidly escalated in both republics. Every Azerbaijani or Muslim from Armenia was displaced and stripped of everything, while most Armenians in Azerbaijan, especially the Armenian population of Baku, were persecuted. One observer noted that ethnic cleansing took place in a different way in the two republics: in Armenia it took place systematically and comprehensively, while in Azerbaijan it took place through sudden, spontaneous, violent actions; (such as the riots and pogroms in Sumgait in 1988 and in Baku in 1990), so there were huge refugee flows crossing the Azerbaijani-Armenian border in both directions during 1988 and 1989; It is worth noting that there are large numbers of Armenians They were forced to leave Baku during that period, while entire Azeri villages in Armenia were evacuated and renamed.⁷

Important decisions were taken in December 1989. The Supreme Soviet of Karabakh issued a decision to annex the region to the Republic of Armenia and disengage from the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Council had taken this decision without the participation of any of the Azerbaijani representatives. It also submitted a request on July 15, 1988 to the Supreme Soviet Council. To approve the decision, but the latter considered this a violation of the constitution and declared the decision invalid. He also rejected the decision from the Supreme Soviet Council of Azerbaijan. As a result, on July 16, the Azerbaijani government announced its rejection of the decision as well. The Azerbaijani government was not satisfied with that, but in January 1989 it announced the abolition of Karabakh's autonomy and its direct annexation. It also announced its imposition of a siege on Armenia and the prohibition of the movement of trains passing from Azerbaijan to Armenia.

Acts of violence increased on both sides and in Karabakh itself. During the period (1988-1990), approximately (300-350) thousand Armenians were displaced from Azerbaijan, while 167 thousand Azerbaijanis were displaced from Armenia, and the violence did not stop in Karabakh despite the efforts made by them. Soviet Union to contain the crisis.⁸

Violence spread to the capital, Baku. On the thirteenth and fourteenth of January 1990, Azerbaijani refugees displaced from Armenia began a massacre of Armenians, while the Azerbaijani army did nothing about the events. Violence was renewed in Sumgait, and the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) condemned it. Front riots, and condemned Moscow's failure to intervene to contain the crisis.

As a result of the increase in religious violence in Azerbaijan, the Soviet government decided to contain the crisis by imposing its control over the areas of violence in Azerbaijan. On January 20, 1990, it sent a military force estimated at more than 20 thousand soldiers to the capital, Baku, under the pretext of protecting the Armenians there. This was followed by a state of violence. Chaos and brutal suppression of those causing violence in the city, which led to the use of violence to control the rioters - according to the Soviet army - which led to human losses estimated in the hundreds according to Russian official sources and in the thousands according to the Azerbaijani Popular Front, which condemned the intervention of the Soviet army and the killing of innocents - according to what she said. The Russian incursion was considered a pretext to control Baku and prevent its rise to power in Azerbaijan. During this, the Soviet army declared a state of emergency in Karabakh, and sent thousands of troops there. Military checkpoints were set up on all roads leading to the capital, Stepanakert, but that did not stop military operations between the Azerbaijanis and Armenians.⁹

The Azerbaijani government accused the Republic of Armenia of helping the Armenian rebels in Karabakh, and called on Moscow to intervene directly to force Armenia to abandon assistance to the rebels - according to it - but Moscow denied this in detail because there was no concrete evidence of that support.¹⁰

Soviet forces, supported by Azerbaijani military units, tried to deport all Armenian citizens who did not hold an Azerbaijani passport, under the pretext that many militias had entered from Armenia and settled in Karabakh and were carrying out military operations against Azerbaijani citizens. Hundreds were arrested from the villages of Khanlar and Jiranboy (Shumyan) and thousands of them were deported. While 22 to 24 Armenian villages were emptied, they were accused of practicing violence and violating human rights, while the Armenian government and the Karabakh government indicated that these operations were carried out to increase tension and with the aim of declaring war, and that the operations were carried out with the approval of Soviet President Gorbachev, and as a result, skirmishes increased between the Azerbaijani and Armenian forces with the aim of regaining those lands. Villages.¹¹

In light of that chaos, the leaders of the popular fronts in the Baltic republics succeeded in arranging a meeting that brought together the Azerbaijanis and Armenians, specifically the leaders of the Azerbaijani Popular Front and the Armenian National Movement in Karabakh in the capital of Latvia (Riga) on February 3, 1990, although none of the movements They did not possess political power at the time, but were key actors in mass mobilization in their republics. But the meeting did not reach the desired result A ceasefire and an end to the existing crisis. It seemed that both parties to the conflict were adhering to their demands and aspirations. The Armenians invoked the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, and the Azerbaijanis defended the principle of territorial integrity. The meeting ended without leaving any room for compromise.¹²

At the same time, the numbers and formations of paramilitary forces on both sides increased, as the parties appeared to be turning once again towards a military solution to the conflict. The Armenians were more active than the Azeris (who seemed to depend more on the Soviet central government for a solution) and a large number of weapons were reported to be flowing from Armenia to Karabakh. Observers observed how planes loaded with military equipment, coming from Beirut, landed in Yerevan and how the equipment was later transported to Karabakh. In this environment of heavily armed paramilitaries, the escalation of the conflict was irreversible. Sporadic clashes became frequent, and by July 1991, casualties in the conflict were estimated at 816 people.¹³

With the escalation of their uprising, Armenian militants began to control Nagorno-Karabakh. The militants were supported by the regular armed forces of the Republic of Armenia - a fact that Armenia still denies despite the existence of evidence of this - and, moreover, Armenia was using the services of some Russian volunteers (in In some cases they were armed with complete units and equipment). These "volunteers" were regular soldiers in the Soviet Armed Forces.¹⁴

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in November 1991, most of the Soviet forces were withdrawn from the conflict zone. This encouraged the Armenians to regain full control over Karabakh, especially after both parties obtained medium and heavy weapons such as heavy artillery, anti-tank missiles, RPGs, and armored carriers. From the withdrawing Soviet forces, on the other hand, the Karabakh Soviet Council - which was revived with a new name, the "National Council of Karabakh" - declared the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and the abolition of its autonomy with the Republic of Azerbaijan.¹⁵

The Azerbaijani government renewed its rejection of the independence of Karabakh and considered that decision null and void. Accordingly, the Azerbaijani forces moved to confront the declaration of independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Armenians responded by attacking and reclaiming the villages, as the Karabakh forces supported by Armenia took control of most of the autonomous regions in addition to their control of seven other provinces that were within sovereignty. Azerbaijani.¹⁶

As the Azerbaijani government became aware of the military strength of Armenians in Karabakh, it set out to secure military equipment in the republic and reclaim all Azerbaijani conscripts from the Soviet Army. Moreover, as a reaction to the declaration of independence, on December 26, the Azerbaijani Parliament abolished the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh and annexed it directly to Azerbaijan. Naturally, this step has more theoretical political significance than real value, because military control over the region was very quickly falling out of the hands of the authorities in Baku.¹⁷ During the year 1992, a major war broke out in Karabakh, and both sides used Soviet mercenaries in the fighting (a number of Russian military units that remained in the region). In February 1992, the Karabakh-Armenian forces, supported by the Rifle Regiment, with a force of 366 soldiers from the Russian army, attacked the village of Kocaeli (about 7 km from Stepanakert) and committed large massacres of the population, with the death toll reaching approximately 200 people. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani sources indicated that the Armenian forces committed crimes against humanity when they stormed the city of Kocaeli, where they killed approximately 613 people, including 63 children, 106 women, and 70 Among the elderly, it is the largest massacre committed since the beginning of the crisis. Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev referred to that massacre on its third anniversary in 1995, saying, "We have many historical evidence about barbarians throughout history, and one of these pieces of evidence is the Armenian attack on Kocaeli, which is the largest It was a wound for us during the twentieth century. The Armenian army did not only want to occupy the city of Kocaeli, but rather it wanted to exterminate our people there. That wound is still hurting us..., all those who died there are martyrs and a symbol of heroism and courage for all the people.¹⁸

Azerbaijan," and he also mentioned that incident on its seventh anniversary in 1999, where he said, "...it is the greatest crime committed against the Azerbaijani people, as Armenian forces supported by 366 Soviet mercenaries stormed the city of Kocaeli and committed the most heinous crimes and massacres against the Azerbaijani people..., Which caused hundreds of deaths of women, children and the elderly, as well as prisoners and wounded..." Those forces also moved and announced their control over the Azerbaijani city of Shusha in Karabakh, which was a base for launching attacks on the capital Stepanakert. Then they took control of the Lachin corridor between Armenia and Karabakh, and also launched In July, those forces attacked Mardkert District and committed major massacres there, but the Azerbaijani forces re-attacked Mardkert District and seized 80% of it, and evacuated approximately 40 thousand Armenian refugees from it. The forces in the Republic of Azerbaijan were unable to confront the strong aggression or protect its lands By the end of 1992, the military situation of Azerbaijan was disastrous. Not only the territory of Karabakh was under the control of Armenian forces, but also the neighboring and surrounding areas, which were inhabited by Azerbaijani residents, and more than 20% of the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan fell under occupation.

This led to a severe refugee crisis in Azerbaijan, with approximately 300,000 refugees arriving from Armenia from 1988 onwards, and internally displaced people who left their homes in Karabakh and surrounding areas numbering between 600,000 and 800,000 people, according to sources. Thus, Azerbaijan was forced to provide shelter to between one million and one million and two hundred refugees. In light of this massive influx of refugees, the international community's aid efforts have actually been negative and wavering. As the total population of Azerbaijan reached less than seven

and a half million people, it is easy to imagine the impact of this influx of refugees on the country. (10 to 15% of the country's population consists of displaced people, some of whom still live without housing or permanent assistance.)¹⁹

On the night of February 26-72, 1993, military confrontations took place between the Karabakh forces supported by Armenia and the Azerbaijani forces in the Mardkert region. As a result, the Armenian forces took control of a large part of it, which strengthened the return of the Armenian population to it and their control over the important energy sources, which is the hydroelectric power station. And the Sarsang fuel tank. They also succeeded in cutting off the main outlet for the Azerbaijani forces to Karabakh through their control of the Terter-Kelbajar road. The Armenian forces had opened fire on citizens fleeing from military operations indiscriminately, and within one week they had displaced more than 60 people. One thousand Azerbaijanis. The Azerbaijani Popular Front, led by President Abu al-Fadl al-Shaybi, accused the commander of the region of Mardkert of falling, Colonel Surat Huseynov, because - according to the Front - he ordered the withdrawal of heavy weapons from it and moved some units necessary to defend it.²⁰

The military arena in Karabakh witnessed the cessation of operations during the period (July - September 1993) due to the turmoil in the internal situation in Azerbaijan. The President of the Azerbaijani Republic, Abu al-Fadl al-Shaybi, relieved the commander of the 709th Brigade, Surat Huseynov, from his position and asked him to return to the capital, Baku, but Huseynov (who was related to Strong relations with the Russian 104th Airborne Division, which is located in the city of Ganji, replacing the Azerbaijani 709th Division. He refused the order and declared his rebellion and coup against the Shaybi government. The Russian forces helped transport some of the rebel Azerbaijani units to the capital, Baku, and there a short war took place between the forces of Shaybi and Huseynov. 70 fighters were killed, and on July 18, President Chibi fled to his hometown of Nakhchivane. After 9 days, the leader of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, Heydar Aliyev, was chosen as President of the Republic, while the Prime Minister was assigned to Huseynov, who retained the Ministry of Defence, Interior, and National Security.²¹

The Russian forces stationed in Aghdam (located 30 km northeast of the capital, Stepanakert) left that area after the events in Baku, leaving a large security vacuum in the region that was exploited by the Karabakh Armenian forces, who besieged the city on July 20 and bombed it with heavy weapons, thus taking control of Mount Al-Farouq and the village of Khidrli. On August 5, Aghdam was completely besieged, except for a road towards the Iranian border, which the Azeris gathered to escape from military attacks. On August 23, the city was controlled.²²

The city was completely occupied, and the Azerbaijani government had declared a state of emergency and moved towards liberating some areas, but to no avail. Accordingly, on August 25, the two sides announced a temporary ceasefire, but the Armenian forces did not adhere to that, and in October they attacked and controlled several Azerbaijani provinces, namely (Qabatli and Jibril). Fizuli and Zanglan) and said that this operation came in response to the artillery bombardment of the Armenian military forces from those cities, and on October 9, violent fighting occurred between the two parties, and each of them accused the other of violating the ceasefire decision, and as a result the clashes between them renewed, and within the limits of the 31 In October, Karabakh forces reached the village of Chitomas, 10 km south of Karakshler on the Akira River, and the Karabakh-Armenian forces advanced 20 km from the Iranian border. During this, the Karabakh-Armenian forces seized all the remaining Azerbaijani regions between Karabakh and the Araks River, and Iran had received 135 One thousand Azerbaijani refugees fled military operations.²³

Russia moved to stop the Armenian military operations on Azerbaijani cities, so it presented a peace initiative on August 31, led by Vladimir Kazimirov, to stop the fighting and withdraw the aggressor forces. Heydar Aliyev also announced after his meeting with Russian President Yeltsin on September 6 that he was fully prepared to stop the fighting and begin peaceful discussions to resolve the crisis. But he refused to meet any delegation from Karabakh because that legitimizes their presence, and at the same time he agreed to extend the ceasefire until November 1993.

The UN Security Council, in its Resolution No. 874, condemned the attack on the Fizuli region and other Azerbaijani regions and cities, and called on the Armenian forces to cease fire and withdraw

from the cities. Iran also condemned the hostile actions and considered this a threat to its national security, and stated this in an official statement published by the Kayhan International newspaper in English, The Iranian Foreign Ministry also condemned the incursion, and reinforced its forces along the border with Azerbaijan.²⁴⁻²⁸

A new factor entered the conflict in Karabakh during December 1993: the Afghan Mujahideen, who launched an attack on December 15 along the front between the Azerbaijani and Armenian forces, especially in the Belagan region (40 km east of Fizuli), which prompted the Armenian forces to open fire. On the city of Belagan, its hospital was bombed, and hundreds of civilians were killed. This fighting continued until mid-February 1994, and for the first time since 1992, the Karabakh forces were forced to retreat, and the Azerbaijani forces seized important areas such as the Horadiz railway junction, the highlands around Agdam and Mordikert, and control of the strategic Omar corridor. As a result, Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan stated from London that his country rejects the presence of Afghan mercenaries - according to him - and that the official Armenian forces will intervene directly if the fighting and forced deportation of Armenians continues.²⁹

The increasing state of violence and fighting between the two countries led the Russian government to take an initiative to put a final halt to that war. It sent Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to meet with the parties to the conflict in May 1994, and he was able to bring together Presidents Heydar Aliyev and Armenian President Petrosyan in Moscow in September 1994. They announced a ceasefire, and a group decided Minsk (whose role we will mention later) of the United Nations sent a peacekeeping force to disputed areas such as Lachin and Shusha.

Azerbaijan had important motives behind ending military operations in Karabakh, which are:

- 1- Removing the security threat from the Azerbaijani forces along their common borders.
- 2- Strengthening Russian-Azerbaijani relations, given that Russia supports the ceasefire initiative.
- 3- The possibility of requesting military, political and economic aid from Russia if Azerbaijan needs it, because the government led by Heydar Aliyev, who has a communist tendency, is heading towards rapprochement with Russia.³⁰
- 4- Strengthening Azerbaijan's global position by strengthening its economy, by working to exploit its natural resources on land and the Caspian Sea, which contributes to the stability of internal conditions.

Then the conflict between Azerbaijan on the one hand and Karabakh and Armenia on the other hand froze, and the situation between them became known as (no war, no peace).

The third section: The international and regional position on the conflict over Karabakh (1992-1994).

First: The United Nations position on the conflict in Karabakh.³¹

After the secession of Azerbaijan and Armenia from the Soviet Union in 1991, and the outbreak of the conflict over the Karabakh region, the United Nations did not intervene as an international peacekeeping organization in the world until 1992. Despite this, it did not become a direct mediator in the conflict, as it delegated this mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Minsk), as that organization has become the main political body concerned with finding a solution to the conflict in Karabakh, and since its formation in 1992, it has set its priorities as follows:

- 1- It aims to find effective solutions to resolve the conflict over Karabakh.³²
- 2- Work to achieve a ceasefire and hold the Minsk conference to resolve the Karabakh problem.
- 3- Strengthening the peace process by deploying peacekeeping forces in the conflict area.

The Security Council took four resolutions during the period (April 1993 - November 1994)

But those decisions remained within the framework of demands to stop hostilities and affirmed the inviolability of internationally recognized borders and the territorial integrity of "the Republic of Azerbaijan and all countries of the region," but they failed to condemn any specific aggressor. All resolutions condemned the seizure of Azerbaijani lands, but in the end they failed to announce their condemnation. Resolution 822 in April 1993 expressed its deep concern about the deterioration of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, and the United Nations' concern about the escalation in armed hostilities, especially the invasion of the Kilbajar district of the

Republic of Azerbaijan at the hands of local Armenian forces, and indicated that this situation threatens peace and security in the region. He expressed his deep concern about the displacement of a large number of civilians and the humanitarian emergency in the region, especially in the Kelbajar region, and reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region, and called on the parties to the conflict to immediately cease all hostilities and hostilities with the aim of establishing a permanent ceasefire. Fire, as well as the immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces from Kilbadjar District, also urged the parties concerned to immediately resume negotiations to resolve the conflict within the framework of the CSCE Minsk Group peace process.³³

Resolution 853 (1993), adopted by the Security Council at its 3259th session, held on July 29, 1993, welcomed the acceptance by the parties concerned of the timetable for urgent steps to implement its resolution 822 (1993), and expressed concern about the escalation in armed hostilities, in particular the seizure of Agdam province. In the Republic of Azerbaijan, he noted that this situation threatens peace and security in the region. He once again expressed his deep concern about the displacement of large numbers of civilians in the Republic of Azerbaijan and the serious humanitarian emergency in the region. He reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan and all other countries of the region, and condemned seizing Agdam District and all other recently occupied areas of the Republic of Azerbaijan, further condemned all hostilities in the region, in particular attacks on civilians and shelling of populated areas, and demanded the immediate cessation of all hostilities and the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the participating occupying forces from Agdam District and all Other regions, supported the continuing efforts of the CSCE Minsk Group to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict.³⁴

Resolution 874 (1993), adopted by the Security Council at its 3292nd session, held on October 14, 1993, expressed grave concern that the continuation of the conflict in and around the NagornoKarabakh region in the Republic of Azerbaijan, and noted that the tensions between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan would lead to Peace and security in the region are at risk. He praised the high-level meetings held in Moscow on 8 October 1993 and expressed the hope that they would contribute to improving the situation and peaceful settlement of the conflict. He reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan and all other countries of the region. He also stressed On the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force in the seizure of territory, and called for the early convening of the CSCE Minsk Conference for the purpose of reaching a negotiated settlement of the conflict as provided for in the timetable, in accordance with the mandate of the CSCE Council of Ministers in March 24, 1992. The decision did not add anything new to the previous two decisions.³⁵⁻³⁷

The last resolution was Resolution 884 (1993), adopted by the Security Council at its 3313th session, held on November 12, 1993, which expressed great concern about the escalation in armed hostilities as a result of violations of the ceasefire, and abuses in the use of force in response to those violations. In particular, the occupation of Zangilan district and the city of Goradiz in the Republic of Azerbaijan. He reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan and all other countries of the region. He also stressed the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force to seize lands. He expressed the deep concern of the United Nations about the recent displacement of a large number of Civilians and the humanitarian emergency in the Zanjilan region, the city of Goradiz, and on the southern border of Azerbaijan. He condemned the violations that occurred after the ceasefire that took place between the two parties, and called on the government of Armenia to use its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan with Resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993). and 874 (1993), ensuring that the forces concerned were not provided with the necessary means to expand their military campaign, called on the parties concerned to immediately cease armed hostilities and hostilities, and unilaterally withdraw the occupying forces from the Zangilan area and the city of Goradiz, and requested the SecretaryGeneral and relevant international agencies to provide assistance Urgent humanitarian relief to affected civilian populations, including in Zangilan district, Goradiz city and on the southern border of Azerbaijan, assisting refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes.³⁹

During 1993, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided assistance to about 53,000 people. Although aid was increased to cover about 300,000 people, by the end of 1994, UNHCR provided aid only to refugees who crossed international borders, but not to those displaced internally. However, despite this, the amount of foreign aid allocated to Azerbaijan is still disproportionate to the emergency circumstances that the country went through, and this fact could be related to international influence factors.

The Minsk Group succeeded in holding a summit in Budapest in December 1994 to coordinate future efforts to resolve the Karabakh crisis, during which all parties agreed to deploy multinational forces to monitor the ceasefire, and to send a special force affiliated with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to maintain peace in conflict areas.

Second: The position of the United States of America and the European Union on the conflict in Karabakh.⁴⁰⁻⁴⁴

The United States recognized the independence of Azerbaijan on December 25, 1991, and the United States, during the era of Bush Sr., opened its first embassy in Azerbaijan on January 28, 1992. However, despite this, the United States of America and the European Union remained far from the problems of the South Caucasus, as the European Union was a modern entity and did not begin. By addressing the foreign policies of distant countries or interfering in their affairs as much as it means arranging the conditions of the Union countries, strengthening their foreign and internal policies, and building an economy that supports the existence of the Union in the distant future. As for the United States, throughout the nineties, its foreign policy was concerned with and worked on geopolitical developments in other places, such as the Balkans and the Middle East. Addressing the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, and the issue of armament and nuclear arsenal Russian, but all of that did not prevent American intervention in the Karabakh issue, as the American administration was more inclined towards Armenia than towards Azerbaijan due to the push of the Christian lobby within the American Congress in that direction, but the American administration was aware of the importance of Azerbaijan from an economic perspective, as it is a country with important oil resources. It cannot be neglected, so the position of the American administration remained wavering throughout the duration of the war, and the American administration also avoided direct intervention as much as possible for fear of provoking Russia and escalating the dispute with it.⁴⁴

Despite the indirect American position in supporting Armenia, this did not prevent it from being supported in non-military matters. In October 1992, Congress passed the Freedom Support Act No. 907. This law deprived Azerbaijan of all forms of American governmental aid, and linked this to respect for international human rights standards, and demanded that it To abandon the blockade imposed on Armenia, stop its use of force against Armenia and Karabakh, and search for a peaceful solution to the conflict.⁴⁵

Therefore, Armenia is the country that received the highest aid among the Soviet countries. Armenia received between 300 and 350 million US dollars. By contrast, aid reaching Azerbaijan from US NGOs amounted to less than US\$25 million. However, the Clinton administration and the State Department attempted a more balanced policy. In March 1994, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, at the request of the Clinton administration, proposed Bill No. 3765, which included lifting aid restrictions on Azerbaijan. But this project faced strong opposition from pro-Armenian representatives.⁴⁶

The American administration tried to intervene repeatedly to resolve the crisis through diplomatic means. On July 1, 1994, retired American Ambassador John J. Maresca (former negotiator in the Minsk Group) submitted a proposal to the US Institute of Peace to resolve the Karabakh crisis.

The idea of the project is based on the idea of an “associated state,” which is an existing situation. In some countries of the world, such as the Cook Islands being linked to New Zealand and the Micronesia Islands to the United States of America, the proposal consists of several elements:

- 1- The return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Karabakh, and giving them their financial rights with international guarantees guaranteed by the United States and donor countries.
- 2- Karabakh will be reconstituted as the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, which will enjoy autonomy within Azerbaijani sovereignty.

- 3- The borders of the new entity will be determined in accordance with the 1988 borders.
- 4- Karabakh's military forces will be reduced to non-offensive forces and will be limited to maintaining order in the region and self-defense.
- 5- Azerbaijan owns a station for its security forces near Karabakh, provided that it does not possess offensive weapons.⁴⁷
- 6- Signing a treaty on economic and security cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and supporting land transport and trade between them via the Lachin and Nakhichevan corridor, provided that the contact areas are monitored by international forces.

After presenting this project, it received the approval of the US Congress and the administration of President Clinton, but the proposal was rejected by the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides, thus eliminating an important proposal to resolve the Karabakh crisis.

Third: Russia's position on the conflict in Karabakh.⁴⁸

The Russian position after the countries' separation from the Soviet Union was in favor of the Armenians. As we mentioned in the second section, how the Russian forces helped the Karabakh forces. This position is due to the bad relations between the Azerbaijani government led by the Popular Front Party and the Russian government, but those relations gradually improved after the party's arrival. The Azerbaijani Communist Party came to power under the leadership of Heydar Aliyev in 1993. After the improvement of relations, Russia worked to achieve its own interests in the Caucasus - a part that the Russians call the "near abroad". Russia wanted to regain control of the borders with Turkey and Iran, and therefore wanted to deploy its forces in Azerbaijan, as it did in Armenia and Georgia. It owns two military bases in Armenia at a time when the Azerbaijan government refused to grant it a base in its country. Russia also tried to control Azerbaijan's oil wealth, and this was made completely clear through Russia's strong refusal to extract Caspian Sea oil, for which the Baku government entered into an investment contract with an international company in 1994, as Andrei Kozyrev personally announced that Moscow does not recognize Azerbaijan's right to exploit Azerbaijan's oil. Caspian Sea until a final solution to the dispute between them is reached.⁴⁹

Regarding the conflict in Karabakh, Russia favored only its mediation and supported the deployment of its own peacekeeping forces in Karabakh and not the OSCE Minsk Group forces, and Armenia was in favor of this solution, while Azerbaijan refuses to accept the mission of Russian peacekeeping forces only, for fear International control over peacekeeping forces may become impossible, but what is credited to the Russians is that they succeeded in declaring a ceasefire between Azerbaijan and Karabakh forces in April 1994 and achieved what the United Nations had been unable to do for several years.⁵⁰

Fourth: The position of Türkiye and Iran on the conflict in Karabakh.

The policies of the main regional actors, Turkey and Iran, towards the Karabakh conflict in the north of the country have been disappointing. The Azerbaijanis are of Uzbek-Turkish origin and they also adhere to the Twelver Shiite sect, so they enjoy strong ethnic and linguistic ties with the Turks, and they are the only people in the former Soviet Union who share the same doctrine as the Iranians. At first, Azerbaijan hoped to be able to secure support from one of these... Powers, and the belief in Baku was that Turkey and Iran would seize this opportunity to show their solidarity with their Muslim relatives, but unfortunately nothing of the kind happened.⁵¹

While both Iran and Turkey declared their willingness to mediate the conflict, neither was prepared to formally support Baku unconditionally. This development was one of the reasons for the dispute between the two countries.

After the Persian-Russian War, Azerbaijan was divided, according to the Turkmenchay Treaty of 1828, into two parts, the southern one, the largest, joined the Qajar state, and the southern other joined Russia.⁵²

Tsarism, and after World War II an Azerbaijani national movement arose to unify the two parts of Azerbaijan, but those movements did not succeed in unifying the two parts of Azerbaijan. The Iranian regime was afraid of violence among the Iranian Azerbaijani minority, so Iran was keen for the Republic of Azerbaijan to be more weak on the northern side, as the Azerbaijani minority in Iran

(which consists of 8 to 15 million people (10-20% of the population of Iran), which in any case is more numerous than the entire population of the Republic of Azerbaijan) this is an important factor that prompts Tehran to support Baku instead of working against it, in order to preserve The Azerbaijani minority calmed down, but the rulers in Tehran did not do this, and they were dealing with the events in Azerbaijan with neglect and indifference, as they saw that the Azeris had integrated well into Iranian society and had a weak Azeri identity, and therefore what they were afraid of was not scary enough, but the fear From the emergence of an oil republic with a strong economy, which leads to raising the idea of nationalism in Iran, especially after the decline in Iranian national income. The Iranian regime has realized this. Iranian leader Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has acknowledged this problem. As Hero says, Rafsanjani realized that in the long run, Azerbaijani nationalism would prove as problematic for the Islamic regime in Tehran as it had proven for the communist administration in Moscow...the emergence of a strong and independent Azerbaijan republic would fan the flames of Azerbaijani nationalism within Iran.⁵³

There was mutual mistrust between the Iranian and Azerbaijani governments, as President AlShaybi stated on certain occasions that the Iranian state was persecuting its citizens and that Azerbaijan would unite its existence within five years. The secular regime in Azerbaijan was afraid that the Islamic revolution would be exported to its country, especially since the majority of the population were Twelver Shiites. Therefore, the government on several occasions arrested members of the Islamic Party and the Talysh Movement and accused them of spying for Iran.

In the end, the result was a paradoxical situation where the Islamic fundamentalist regime in Iran ended up supporting Christian Armenia against Shiite Muslim Azerbaijan. Moreover, Azerbaijan's attempts at rapprochement with the United States led to Iran being excluded from the oil consortium, which the United States set as a condition for achieving a consortium. The move only worsened Baku's already strained relations with Tehran.⁵⁴

In the case of Turkey, the government's position has always been more supportive of Azerbaijan. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey worked to strengthen its relations with Azerbaijan. Although Turkey is a participating member of the Minsk Group, this requires it to remain neutral, but it was not like that throughout the period of the conflict. The Turkish government Since the 1990s, it has provided significant military aid to Azerbaijan, provided advice to the Azerbaijani forces, and worked to cut the border with Armenia after the outbreak of the conflict for the purpose of pressuring it to resolve the Karabakh crisis. Turkey was on the verge of entering the war in May 1992 when the Armenian forces attacked Nakhichevan, and the Turkish forces even It discussed this seriously and considered that the Kars Treaty with Russia in 1921 gave it the right to do so, but Russia warned it against military intervention because that would lead to a third world war, which discouraged the Turkish forces from direct intervention. Turkey was not satisfied with that, but rather supported Azerbaijan's position in the media. It criticized the opposition. Turkey, including the main opposition Motherland Party and Alp Arslan's National Movement Party, harshly criticized the government for allowing the "genocide of Azerbaijanis and leaving Azerbaijan alone." 'But the official position of the Turkish government was very cautious for two factors: first: Turkey's attempt to make the strong alliance with the United States a success, and the second: the legacy of the Armenian genocide in 1915 (although Turkey still refuses to recognize that genocide). So that any Turkish action against Armenia will lead to renewed strong protest against the genocide against the Armenians.⁵⁵

Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel nevertheless tried to appeal to President George Bush to intervene and mediate the conflict, ordering that aircraft en route to Armenia through Turkish airspace be searched for weapons', and even threatened to mobilize the Turkish army on the Armenian border. However, the Turkish actions were no more significant. They were just statements, and they did not have any significant impact on the course of events.⁵⁶

In general, Turkey has been very careful not to jeopardize its relations with Russia, as Turkey has important trade interests. However, the fact remains that Azerbaijan did not receive the expected support from Türkiye. Azerbaijan's dissatisfaction was particularly strong when, after US pressure, Turkey lifted the total embargo on Armenia that it had imposed with Azerbaijan, preventing humanitarian aid from reaching Armenia via Turkey. The Azerbaijani reaction was common with

phrases such as “They claim to be our brothers but they give bread to our enemies.” In the end, Türkiye did little to support Azerbaijan. However, Turkey maintained its friendly stance, in contrast to Iran, and exerted international pressure for the Azerbaijani issue – an act undertaken by Turkey alone in the international community.⁵⁷

In short, Azerbaijan did not receive actual support from any country in the region. The only country to defend and support the Azeris verbally was Turkey, due to a variety of internal and external reasons of the other countries involved, these tended to support the Armenians or remain silent on the issue.⁵⁸

Conclusion.

The research concluded with results, the most important of which are the following:

- 1- The Karabakh region is considered one of the regions with a Christian majority, and it has what distinguishes it from other Muslim regions in Azerbaijan, and has in common with the Christian Armenians in terms of religion and social customs.
- 2- Karabakh was subject to internal and external political balances throughout the era of Soviet control. The process of its transfer to Azerbaijani control took place according to what was required by the Soviet political interest and not according to the desires of the population or their political leaders.
- 3- The Karabakh issue remains one of the inflammatory issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan that is capable of exploding at any moment due to the great differences between the two governments and their peoples.
- 4- The fall of the Soviet Union contributed to the outbreak of events surrounding the fate of Karabakh. The Soviet Union did not work to solve that problem or lay the foundations for solving it, so the crisis erupted after the dissolution of the Union in 1991.
- 5- Both the governments of Karabakh and Armenia were behind the political and then military escalation with Azerbaijan.
- 6- Armenia supported Karabakh politically and militarily, but it did not declare war clearly and publicly on Azerbaijan, wary of Turkish interference or Islamic support.
- 7- The United Nations failed to put an end to that war and did not provide clear and practical steps to contain it. It also did not succeed in providing full protection for those displaced and injured by that war, so its aid was limited and had little significant impact. Politically, it contented itself with denouncing the war without condemning any party. In which .
- 8- The position of the major powers was timid and wavering and did not put pressure on the parties to the conflict for the purpose of ending the war.
- 9- Iran’s position was very negative, even though Azerbaijan shares commonalities with it, such as religion, sect, and ethnic overlap. Iran stood by and watched throughout the duration of the conflict and did not offer to help Azerbaijan politically, militarily, or even humanitarially. As for Turkey, its role was also weak, but more clear than its role. Iranian.
- 10- The Karabakh issue remains unresolved and one of the postponed problems capable of exploding at any moment.

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- 8 - Iram Khalid, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, P27.
- 9 - Iram Khalid, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, P27
- 10 - Nariman Karbalai Najafoglu Narimanov (1860-1925): Nariman Nerimanov was born in the city of Tbilisi. He completed high school at the Gori seminary in 1890, and in 1908 he graduated from the Faculty of Medicine at Noorossia University (Odessa). He is a prominent playwright in Azerbaijani literature, and a social and political figure. In 1917, Neriman Nerimanov became chairman of the Central Committee of the Hamat organization and head of its newspaper Hamat. After the collapse of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and the proclamation of the Azerbaijan SSR, Neremanov assumed the position of Chairman of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR. He is Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR, First Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Azerbaijan SSR, First President of the Transcaucasian SSR and Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. For more see:
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