

Secularism in France Between Openness and Privacy: Islamophobia and Identity Dialogue as Models

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Abstract

Multiculturalism has been entrenched in the history of most Western countries since 1970 with different nationalities, ethnicities, cultural and religious backgrounds. However, majority of studies have shown contrary reports in the last two decades. In the West, Islam is not a new phenomenon yet the study of Muslims in France poses some levels of intricacies. The dynamics of Muslims both internally and externally is interesting to study. Internally, French Muslims are from diverse ethnicities and races across Asia and Africa, which impairs its unity and integration. Externally, Islam is not a native religion in Europe, thus, it combats challenges to thrive in a new environment considering the fact that Jew-Christianism has long been a cultural tradition of France and Europe. Furthermore, the recent influx of Muslims from several unsettled areas in the Middle East and Africa is significant. Based on this background, the aim of this literary research was to determine the extent of Islamophobia in France. The results of the study showed that the strengthening of identity between Muslim and non-Muslim community groups led to the development of Islamophobia. This was due to some historical events ranging from the influx of large numbers of immigrants to France to the controversy over terrorist attacks which violated the values of civilization.

Keywords: Identity dialogue, islamophobia, secularism

1. Introduction

Islam has entered Europe since the conquest of Andalusia, and the arrival of Muslims in southern France in a battle Poitiers, and went back to its south and east after the opening of Asad Ibn al-Furat to Italian Sicily, and

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the Ottomans opened to the Balkans and their arrival to the outskirts of the Austrian capital Vienna and its siege twice.

Since then, Islam and the presence of Muslims have become a major component in the history and present of Europe and a potential influence factor even on its future, and France is considered among the most European countries to attract Muslim communities, especially the Maghreb. Today the Islamic religion is the second religion in the country after Christianity religion, and in the face of the rising right-wing tide and the growing phenomenon of exaggerated fear of Islam or what is termed as Islamophobia, President Nicolas Sarkozy adopted the idea of establishing a long and deep dialogue on the fundamentals and advantages of the French identity in order to block the path in front of the extreme right, which takes issues of Islam and immigrants, increased it in its election campaigns and within the agenda of its political programs, but the irony is that the dialogue with which i'm want to strengthen French national unity is heading today towards creating rifts in French society, due to its exploitation in developing a culture of hatred towards Muslims in particular and the escalation of levels of negative perception towards Islam, including the strengthening of the Islamophobia wave that sweeps Europe in general, and this is illustrated by the issue of banning the veil and restricting the veil, which fluctuates between emphasizing the necessity Respecting the secular character of the French state and the feelings of hostility towards Muslims and values Islamism is spreading among large groups of generations of Muslim immigrants, and even among a number of French themselves.

Therefore, the problematic of the intervention revolves around the true dimensions and goals of the dialogue of identity in France, so what are the real goals behind establishing a dialogue on national identity in France more than two centuries after the birth of the republic and the establishment of the foundations of the secular state?

This problem, which derives from a set of necessary questions in the analysis: Was the establishment of such a dialogue dictated by the desire of French decision-makers to affirm the foundations of the French identity to ensure the cohesion of French society with a multifaceted race and religion? How can this dialogue deviate from its goals? Declared and exploited politically and takes a racist dimension? And can this dialogue be seen as a reflection of the wave of islamophobia that is sweeping the West in general and France in particular? Can we classify successive decisions regarding the headscarf and veil as part of an organized policy targeting Islam in France after the growing hysteria of fear of Islamization of the country?

2. Significance Of The Study

Islam is considered today the second largest religion in France after Christianity (although there are no accurate statistics on the number of Muslims in France because conducting statistics on a religious basis is prohibited in French law, unofficial statistics estimated their number at the beginning of the new millennium at about 4 million, half of them French citizens who hold citizenship, and the number is estimated today at more than 5 million.

It is still difficult for a large number of French pepople today to accept this demographic reality, and the debate about Muslims in France often begins and ends as a social problem, and question that is often asked also is: Can Muslims integrate into French society? This question is based on the belief the prevailing conflict between Islamic values and their western counterparts and the formation of Muslims by a dangerous group (Cesari 2002, 36)

This negative perception of Islam and Muslims in France is due to the convergence of several historical and cultural backgrounds at the level of the external environment (European and international) or the French internal environment, so the French view of the existence of Islam and its community on its lands cannot be separated from the hysterical fear of Islam that prevails in the world, with Samuel Huntington presenting his thesis on the *clash of civilizations* and with the events of September atheist and the dire consequences of it.

After the events of September 11th, Islamophobia, which is described as a kind of racism and fear of Islam, it not only controlled the discourse of the media, but also European political life, and the post-September 11th period was marked by the issuance of many laws aimed at preventing Terrorist attacks by Islamic militants, but despite assurances, European officials targeted these laws to terrorists and not to Islam, but the language used and the actions taken led Muslims to adopt the opposite impression, as the events of September 11th strengthened awareness that the Jewish-Christian values on which Europe was based are completely different from Islamic values) (Sayyid 2014, 10–25).

The west considers Islam a strange religion different from Christianity and Judaism, although it exists in most western countries, and Western perceptions are still based on the stereotype of violent Islam that is not subject to change from the colonial past, and it is the image that provides the basis for the West's misunderstanding of situations and events. To which Muslims are a party. For example, Samuel Huntington

remained adamant about his static view of Islamic civilization and the psychological characteristics of an unchanging Islamic character. With the change of time and space and his work marked with the clash of civilizations, it shows how such a view is enough to take Islam as a new threat to the west after the end of the cold war and to claim opposition to Islam of modernity (Marrancie 2004, 105–106).

At the level of the European space to which France belongs directly, and in front of the increasing numbers of muslim communities and Muslims of European origins, there is a fear of converting Islam to what Europe is today. (Or what it could be in the future), which puts Europe in a state of contradiction and conflict, on the one hand, it invites its Muslims to be Muslims in Europe, in other words, the Muslims who adapt their cultural and religious values to be citizens in the new Europe that includes Islam as well, but at the same time it behaves in a way that suggests that Muslims can only survive as mere Muslims in Europe, in other words as strangers and foreigners in a Christian-European environment and islamophobia are part of this Christocentric European environment (central the path that will have its social and political impacts) (Lewicki & Shooman 2019, 1–14).

On the French level, there is the French version (*the clash of civilizations*) of stands behind the widespread misconception and divergent reality of Islam and Muslims in France, in the words of Jocelyn Cesare, where fears have increased from the marked presence of Islam in France since the eighties, and the increasing number of Muslims coming from different Islamic countries such as Turkey and Senegal, but most of them hail from North African countries, and they are the ones who pose the greatest challenge to imitating French homogeneity, and the difficulties they face are caused by bitter memories. Of the French colonial era in North Africa, which caused many French people to struggle with feelings of contradiction between superiority and shame or remorse with the stability of Muslims in France since the war Algeria's independence, and history repeats itself in another way on the other side of the Mediterranean with an exchange of roles. The same people who used to form a minority and search for the rule of an Algerian majority in North Africa, find themselves today a majority trying to integrate an Algerian minority on their French soil.

Fear and apprehension about Islam in France take high levels because his arrival ignited long-standing nostalgia the Lycée managed to hide it from the surface, which is the difficult path that the French took To issue the 1905 law that separated the state from the church and its place in French culture, after all the law was not seeking to encourage religious freedom, as much as it was seeking to weaken Catholic influence By placing Catholicism on an equal footing with religious minorities in public affairs, in practice the law intended to restrict religious belief in private space to become a personal matter. As for his ideal goal, he was In discrediting religious values in all personal, family, cultural, and political fields, and over the decades the main religious groups - Christian and Jewish - have achieved peace and difficult coexistence with secularism by adapting religious expressions to the personal sphere, but the stability of Muslims in the country has threatened this peace, and he posed a new problem about the boundaries between the public and personal sphere and returned to renew the clash between religious freedom and political tolerance (which is the clash that is reflected today in the issues of the veil, the niqab, building mosques, minarets, etc) (Bleich 2012, 18–189).

Despite its numerical superiority, the Islamic community is less organized and influential compared to the Jewish community, for example, the oldest and most organized, when simultaneous attacks on Islamic symbols in France are two years 2001 and 2002 Muslims did not formally appeal to the French authorities as did the Jewish organizations. Because Muslims are not structured within the framework of a commission that counts those attacks and therefore these attacks on Islam and Muslims did not give rise to the same comments and denunciations that the attacks on Jewish synagogues, for example.

The progress of the Jewish community in France partly explains the organizational problems that Muslims suffer from there, because attempts to develop umbrella organizations for French Muslims of different orientations were unsuccessful. Back then, who founded the council of reflection on Islam in France.

In the 1993, the right-wing minister of the interior, Charles Pasqua, wanted to establish the representative council of French Muslims. Chaired by Dalil Abu Bakr, the dean of the Paris grand mosque, but it was just ink on paper and internal conflicts between Muslims followed it mixed with political and security events in a context characterized by bombings in Paris attributed to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, and when John Pierre Schwenmann became minister of the interior in the socialist Lionel Jospin government, he decide in 1999 to conduct a wide consultation and provided his right-wing successor, Nicolas Sarkozy, a real working ground that allowed him in December 2001 to announce elections to establish the French council for Islamic religion, was a formal election because the head of the Algerian council, Dalil Abu Bakr, was appointed by the then minister of the interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, and only two of his deputies were elected, namely, Fouad Alawi (Union of Islamic Organizations in France), who is affiliated with the Brotherhood, and Mohammed Bashari from the national Federation of French Muslims loyal to Morocco, and it is noticeable on the leadership composition of the majlis that its president, Abu Bakr directory, does not enjoy popularity among the Muslim

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community despite his presidency of a mosque Paris, however, is not considered a religious reference and inherited the position from his father, and because of his reception to the Ambassador of Israel in France in his office where he received congratulations from him on his new position, just as the French council for Islamic religion that brings together the most important currents that make up the muslim community: Algeria, Morocco and the muslim Brotherhood, the French authorities wanted him to have a clearer picture of these currents and their movements, so they established an easily controlled organization for them (Vidgen & Yasseri 2019, 1–13).

In light of these intertwined historical and cultural backgrounds between what is European and global and what is an internal French matter, the muslim community in France lives in an attempt to impose its presence and organize itself in front of the growing stream of islamophobia, the escalation of the right-wing tide in France, and the challenge of dialogue of national identity adopted by the French authorities.

3. The Beginnings of the Dialogue of the National Identity in France

The French Ministry of Immigration, Integration and National Identity, led by Minister Eric Besson, announced the opening of what it called a major national dialogue related to the identification of identity French patriotism, and this two-month dialogue, January - February 2010 works to answer, according to the official statement of the ministry, about two questions: The first is: "What does it mean to be French today? The second is: "What did immigration offer to you?" The dialogue also proposes a re-understanding of many terms that have been associated with the French Republic, such as the homeland - secularism - national solidarity - the possibility that schoolchildren will sing once a year in the Marxist (meaning the French national anthem), it is the major national dialogue held in each of the French city directorates and in the provinces French overseas in the Pacific and Caribbean regions, with the participation of district officials, parliamentarians, representatives of political forces, unions, civil society organizations, student councils, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens (Meuleman 2018, 15).

Since the announcement of the start of the dialogue, more than 340 meetings have been organized across the country, and the private site of this discussion has visited 750,000 people, and during the first weeks the site received a huge number of responses the act is racist, and the socialist opposition decided to boycott the meetings because it saw it as bad for immigrants and Muslims a lot, and members of the right-wing Union for a popular movement did not hesitate. Ruling on giving a lack of package, one of the state ministers demanded that the muslim youth walk in the general direction of society if they want to find work, at least, the mayor of marseille complained that many Muslims took to the street after a football match, as Jean-Marie Le Ban leader the extreme national front party expressed his opinion, saying: "We have to be bold by asking the real hidden questions behind the lines of this debate about national identity. We should rather ask for help. Our traditions have been marginalized." Our culture and identity due to immigration (Anna Mansson McGinty 2018, 1–19).

4. The Implications of Opening A Dialogue on National Identity

The decision of the French authorities to open a dialogue on national identity after more than two centuries on the establishment of the French revolution and the founding of the republic and the adoption of secular principles raised many legitimate questions, centered on the significance of raising such a problem at this particular time, and the motive behind the search for what the French identity represents and strive to redefine it after decades of resolving this complex issue.

It seems that many French people, especially the educated and anti-government, and even ordinary citizens, they were not convinced by the justifications presented by the Sarkozy government (to formulate a program of action that would consolidate republican and values, and it reinforces the French's pride in their affiliation with the French nation). Certainly, the topic has dimensions and other undeclared indications, which can be found through an analysis of the nature of the speech that prevailed throughout the dialogue, and the repercussions that it produced, which were observed by interested observers, and the most important of which are:

a. Islamophobia is at the heart of French identity and dialogue

The intense Islamic presence in France and its representation of the second religion after Christianity, and it forms the majority of the muslim community members of Moroccans coming from the former French colonies in North Africa, especially from Algeria, gave the impression that this dialogue is intended primarily for Muslims and their Islamic religion.

The debate has shifted from answering the central question, "Who is French?" to demand the integration of Muslims into France and respect for the country's Christian values, and thus reveal the true face of the end of the dialogue. It also constituted a shift that predicts the innocence of the question posed from the beginning and the serious results it can lead to and this was confirmed by the lengthy article by president Nicolas Sarkozy on the pages of the newspaper "Le Monde" on 9 December 2009, where he linked the ongoing debate on identity

patriotism and France's relationship with Islam, despite an attempt to reassure Muslims by saying that: "He will remain a guarantor of the freedom to practice their beliefs in places of worship appropriate to them," but he called them to: "Respect for Christian values and not to provoke the feelings of the host," given that they are coming from afar (**Cesari 2002, 36**).

The facts indicate that the target by stimulating dialogue on identity is only Arabs and Muslims, because if the matter goes beyond this framework, Sarkozy will himself be the first victim, as he of Hungarian origins departs a lot from the francophone field to which the majority belong. Overwhelming by Arabs and the Muslims of France, and that the main engine of the French dialogue on identity is nothing but the phenomenon of islamophobia emerging in the West in general and the old continent in particular, that phenomenon that is fueled by global Zionism with its information and financial arsenal in the world, as well as by the lobby Zionist, who penetrates most circles of power, influence, and decision in the world, and this is not evidenced by the media noise preceded by this dialogue on issues such as the issue of the veil and then the veil, and whatever Reasons for the emergence and spread of the phenomenon of Islamophobia, whether political, religious or ideological, it remains a racist phenomenon in the first place, and from here it is not possible to understand the discourse of identity in the context of this phenomenon except as a confrontational discourse whose ultimate goal is to prove oneself to the other's negation (**Yendell & Huber 2020, 1–15**).

The great French historian, Benjamin Lines, confirms in an interview with the Moroccan Socialist Union newspaper, the day after the launch of the dialogue on identity, that Islam in France has become the focus of the ongoing debate, as he says that the problem at hand is not the ongoing debate about national identity in France, but the problem is the meaning that was conferred on the identity in addition to the frequency of these discussions, and because of its speed the discussion has shifted from dialogue turn identity into a conversation about foreigners and religion, especially Islam, within three weeks. The debate then turned from a dialogue on the status of identity to talk about the position of Islam in France, meaning that Islam has become the main element in the debate while it is merely a component of a country that is supposed to be lucky. A country where religious affiliation falls within the realm of private life. It is this deviation that poses a problem in this debate (**Abbas 2020, 1–15**).

In the same dialogue, Benjamin argues that it is natural for Muslims, especially Moroccans, to feel that they are the target of all this uproar despite the presence of the Maghreb and Islamists in France more than a century ago. He says in this regard: "The Maghreb presence in France dates back to a long time, which is what a large number of people do not know, and I believe that the presence of Islam must become very new here because the workers the Maghreb people settled in France since the 1920s, the Paris Mosque was built in 1926, the French Islamic Hospital in Popiné was established in 1935 and the Islamic cemeteries were found a year ago, 1937 there is, therefore a real battle that must be fought for Islam to become a very normal giving in France.

Misunderstanding and misperception contributed to increasing French apprehension about Islam, a feeling that began to increase with the emergence of appearances that were considered evidence of the renewal and awakening of religious feeling among French Muslims at the end of the eighties, where Muslim immigrants began building mosques, opening shops and the selling of halal meat, and the claim of lands to be for Muslim cemeteries, and the feeling prevailed Fear of the return of Islam among the majority of the French people. Also contributed to that apprehension, the failure to recognize social and cultural differences between Muslims, and many from the French, they linked the locally increasing Islamic appearances with the rise of political Islam in the Arab and Islamic worlds, and they put moderate French Muslims in the same position with the violent fundamentalist movements (**Wilkins & Laflamme 2018, 90**).

This exaggerated fear of all that is Islamic embodied in a large number of attacks and the harassment of the muslim community and its places of worship and even its landfills, by groups extremist and racist, which reflects the state of turmoil and tension dominating the drifting French society little by little, towards islamophobia, with all the risks it carries. In the report of the European center on racism and xenophobia of the European union (EUMC) interested in monitoring the situation of racism and xenophobia in the countries of the union, came the annual report on France, which was prepared by the National Consultative Committee for Human Rights (CNCDDH) year 2005 to show a large number of attacks on racial and religious grounds that Moroccans and Muslims were subject to in the country of human rights in 2004 it reached 352 attacks, including 266 verbal threats and violence, and 64 material or physical attacks violent ("Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia," n.d., p. 73).

This is what threatens the social peace in the country, because the arrogant and despicable view of Muslims, especially Moroccan immigrants among them were behind the events of the suburbs after the speech of the then French interior minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, in which he used the term *riff* to describe migrant suburban youth.

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Topic immigration here cannot be separated from the phenomenon of islamophobia, because the prevailing belief in Europe is that the immigration movement is the main reason for the endemism of Islam in France.

The events of November 2006, which took place in various Parisian suburbs and spread through to the rest of French soil, reconsidered a conflict that never stopped, and once again launched the dialogue about integration and the renewal of residence permits became more and more related to the extent of the merger, and in July 2006 a law was issued stopping the automatic settlement of residency, as soon as 10 years have passed since it was over French soil. It is an important step in the development of French immigration policy (**Saeed 2007, 19**).

b. Banning the Headscarf and Niqab Culminates in the Phenomenon of Islamophobia

Perhaps the most proven proof of the Islamophobia rampant in the French society behind the opening of a dialogue on national identity is that synchronization between the beginning of the dialogue on the one hand and the discussion of the draft law to prevent the veil on the other hand.

After a law was enacted to prevent the headscarf in French educational institutions as a religious symbol, with the passing of the bill on the legislative institutions that approved it, and former French president Jacques Chirac signed the decision on March 15, 2004, and entered into force on 2 September 2004 with the new school entrance, many justifications were made for the law, as it not only touches the veil, but all other religious symbols, whether Christian, Jewish or other, but the majority of observers they considered it a law directed at the headscarf worn by muslim girls in French schools, and as such was known in the foreign media as the "Headscarf Prevention Law", a law that came on the recommendation of an investigation committee led by Bernard Stacey on ways to implement in practice the principles of secularism. By order of president Jacques Chirac, and if the debate centered on the headscarf, that was due to his consideration by the committee, it is a religious symbol that contradicts the principles of secularism and equality between males and females, and considers it a manifestation of oppression and discrimination against a muslim woman or girl who may be forced to wear it outside her will (**Marrancie 2004, 105–106**).

Here, the negative perception of the veil is evident among Westerners, as Gabriel Maroni says: "The main issue here is not the veil per se and its Islamic connotation, but its symbolism and goal imagined by Westerners." (**Brayson 2019, 60**)

This negative perception is not born today. The first confrontation with secular France with the headscarf was in 1989 in what has since been known as the "Scarf's affair", where two girls refused to take off who expresses their Islamic identity, which led to their exclusion from taking the entrance examination to the high school, and this issue re-enacted the struggle between the perceptual perceptions of secularism, the first perception that rejects any possibility to wear Islamic dress in schools, which corresponds to the closed view that rejects any religious appearances or symbols in public institutions, and the second perception that calls on the republic not to give up on behalf of her children except in the case that they came to spread the influence of radical Islam, but in both cases, the appearance of two girls in Islamic dress was considered as a sign of the failure of the French integration system, and it is the failure that paves the way to re-Islamize the suburbs (**Lajevardi & A. R. Oskooii 2018, 35**).

Banning the veil was only an introduction to preventing the niqab in public places, and regardless of the juristic debate about the legality of wearing the niqab or not, looking at the issue as a matter of personal freedom a problem about respecting individual freedoms in the country of freedoms, especially with the debate about its prevention coinciding with the start of the debate on national identity.

From 8 July to 26 January 2010, deliberations took place within the framework of a parliamentary committee composed of 32 deputies regarding the imposition of a ban on the wearing of the veil or burqa in public places, as for supporters of the complete ban for the appearance of women veiled in public places, this matter is necessary to protect the values of the republic, gender equality, and prevent the risk of the spread of anti-French fundamentalism and anti-white values. As for the opponents of the decision from Muslims and human rights organizations, wearing the veil is a marginal issue, but the parliamentary committee works as a tool to distract the French from their real economic and social problems and distort the image of Muslims in France, especially since the communist mayor, André Gerin, who is known for his hostility to Moroccan immigrants and who chaired the parliamentary committee in charge of studying the issue, gave a racist and hostile dimension to the topic when he stated: "Should we let the ideology of the fundamentalist Salafist movement that leads a struggle against France and the white element exist?" This occurs at a time when the French ministry of interior estimates that the number of veiled women does not exceed two thousand, while estimates by the intelligence services indicate that they do not exceed 367 women in the whole country (**Quinn 2019, 15**).

We understand this point further when we recall the Sarkozy speeches in which the veil was rejected and before that veil, devoting many of its media interventions to the sanctity and values of the republic, all

indications point to the presence of a French alert against the Islamic cultural tributary, and an attempt to stop indications of its penetration into the French national identity, a tactic that intersects with the extreme right, and feeds France's concerns about the growing Islamic presence on its soil, and stimulates its desperate defense of Christianity on the one hand and secularism on the other hand, although the religious manifestations practiced by French Muslims do not extend beyond the personal sphere.

Also, the one who contemplates the French immigration minister's proposals may find a way to materialize after the end of the identity debate, which is the project of establishing a contract for republican integration that every foreigner who visits France or reside in it, in addition to subjecting the granting of citizenship to the condition of mastering the French language, digesting the values of the republic and being able to perform maresia, all of these ideas start from the assumption that Muslims in France, they are outside the French cultural body and that France's interest in stopping the current of muslim immigration, whose number has increased too much, they have become a political, economic and cultural burden on France, therefore, the announcement of opening a debate on national identity conceals a political-security ploy in the interior of it, with laws that allow the authority the freedom to dispose of Islamic bleeding within it, especially since years ago few announced that France had turned its destination towards the emigration of the elites and the intelligentsia, that is, the selective emigration that served its development project and the francophone (Keles et al., n.d., 270).

c. French privacy in the face of the currents of globalization

Many specialists have found a link between the dialogue that took place on identity in France and the increasing impact of globalization trends on cultural privacy and French identities, which threaten to lose its historical position as a center of cultural influence and civilizational distinction.

The historian Ernest Renan, the first to think about the question of national identity in the aftermath of France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War in the year 1871, defended the nation as a "one-spirit soul" composed of two parts: the first part is the "fertile inheritance of memories" Which has its roots in the past, As for the second part, which is related to the present and paving the way to the future, it consists of a common will on the part of citizens to build their common lives together, and Renan has given great priority to this. The will in common life that transcends any racial definition and puts the French idea of a nation in direct contrast to the almost racist idea of a "nation of the people", which has dominated German traditions.

According to this view, the national identity constitutes a spiritual concept that depends on a shared history and a set of values. Some of these values are rooted in a kind of secular Christianity, while others are in the enlightenment revolutionary beliefs related to human rights, equality, and the French language. Secular schools, the idea of state responsibility for common interests, and the application of republican principles.

This view of national identity that transcends race, color, origin, and religion that has become the subject of conflict now, and the identity crisis that France is now harassing is fueled by the conjunction and synchronization of many factors on top of it, globalization and the resulting doubts, and the European Union, which reduces the freedoms of leaders patriotism, and the American strategic hegemony that led to the decline of the French position in the world, and the rise Asian powers, and all this poses a serious challenge to thinkers who sometimes mock the idea of the nation itself, claiming that we are now inhabiting a world of post-nationalism, and they see that national identity must be abandoned in favor of European identity, even if the feeling of belonging to Europe was not firmly established among the peoples of the European Union (Newstreet et al., 2018, 9).

The question of identity is not a new question within the French concerns and preoccupations, but it is being asked today within a new context and in light of new pressures exerted by the structural and structural factors imposed by the era globalization, the dialogue of identity in France today is therefore related to how the structural factors related to the context of globalization affect the adaptation of the question of identity as it poses in the political, cultural and media landscape today.

Among all the developed Western countries, France today appears to be the country most affected on a large scale and unprecedented by the results and spin-off effects of globalization on the cultural level, which are more severe impacts on the minds and souls than those on the economic, financial and technological levels, as it takes place in France today, in general, the holistic dynamics of globalization represent as sweeping factors, disrupting and shaking violently what has been for decades and successive generations seen as essential or even formative elements of identity. French in its political, cultural, and civilizational implications.

Observers may not notice the phases of discussions and debates regarding the question of identity, the character of the severity that characterized the presentation of problems, ideas, analyzes and attitudes, and they certainly stood at the level that inflammation reached him whenever the tables of dialogue raised issued related to the concept of identity in a society that trends structurally towards cultural diversity with all its consequences,

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due to objective data created by migration trends over a long period time, pluralism is accelerating globalization today, both in terms of its pace and extent, regardless of options. Declared or doctrinal references for leaders (**Yendell & Huber 2020, 14**).

The great philosopher, Marcel Gauche, summarizes the state of confusion in which his country is present today in its journey to search for its identity and its inability to absorb the changes taking place, affirming that the French specificity characterized by its strength, it finds it difficult today to absorb the type of change that globalization requires in order to reduce distances for itself. France today is witnessing a historical stalemate that includes all fields. Many people have them the impression that they are imprisoned in a process opposite to their direction while they are unable to do anything, knowing that this process means death for them, or it means the death of what they are attached to politically, culturally and culturally (the historical and cultural heritage of France), the global development of the French raided and sacrificed all that is required of them is contrary to their historical gain, and they can no longer confirm their historical and political model (**Gilks 2019, 20**).

What lies behind the dilemma in which French privacy flies in the face of globalization, is the contradiction between the vision historically carried by the French about their country's role as a primary center for crystallizing universal values according to them (human rights, freedom and secularism), and between another direction completely contrary to the French orientation, that is one direction the dynamics of globalization that reject every possibility to visualize a single center - whatever factors it may have influence in the present or from the elements of historical legitimacy in the past - has the potential to define criteria, patterns and trends, i.e. reject the idea of cultural centralism (which is the idea that culture has long sought French for its contradiction and attempt to impose its cultural model and evidence its long history in dealing with its colonies even after its independence).

The problem of identity presented in France today is a reflection of the fear of losing what printed the French memory about two centuries ago, meaning the location of the global center directed at the cultural level, so the pace of globalization accelerated today it threatens three principles guiding the French identity, which is integration (in dealing with immigration) and secularism (in controlling the relationship between what is religious and what is secular) and the public utility (in the field of public service management) at all these levels the French model is exposed to unprecedented pressure, the demand for integration imposed on immigrants, especially non-Europeans (among them Muslims), leads to the abolition and marginalization of the right to difference, and secularism in the strictly radical form highlighted the dangers of slipping to serve cases unrelated to the separation of religion and the state, such as the issue of the veil (and then the niqab), and the annex year, which refers to a specific concept of equality, has entered into contradiction with the principle of equal opportunity in multiple social classification societies such as Western societies (**Hafez 2020, 7**).

The dialogue on the national identity in France can be seen if it is a kind of reaction and self-sufficiency and about the cultural identity and about French nationalism in front of sweeping globalization that comes to the privacy of entities nationalism, and the Islamic values here are taken into account by the French as a threat to French privacy, because fear of islamization of the country is widespread in France as is the case in all of Europe.

5. Conclusion

Islamophobia is penetrating deep into the French, and a dialogue on national identity after all this time, and the inability to ensure the desired homogeneity in a mosaic society, and a rising right-wing, and a dispersion between local privacy, European belonging and globalization, these are all features of a French society that is searching for its identity again, after Islam has become the second religion in it, and converted to a component essential in the culture and lifestyle of a large portion of its citizens, whether they are French in origin or of non-French origins.

Today, the country of freedoms and human rights is at a critical historical crossroads. Either creating a combination capable of ensuring assimilation of the Islamic existence and making Islam a very new matter in French society, in the words of Benjamin lines, and recognizing the right of Muslims to preserve their identity and cultural distinction with respect the values of the society in which they live, and the ability to create a spirit of pride in belonging to the French nation in them, which is achieved by a wise policy to assimilate them and not impose homogeneity on them with secular Catholic values alien to them or marginalize them entirely in poor suburbs, even though Muslims are also required to interact positively with the community sheltering them, and provide a good image of Islam and Islamic ethics capable of adapt to modernity without losing its privacy.

In the event of failure to reach this combination, the current right-wing perspective based on the policy of imposing homogeneity and imposing French values will be the victor, which will not serve France and distort its historical image, because the policies of pressure, coercion and spreading hatred towards Islam and Muslims

currently followed will not it helps to integrate, not to bring minorities closer, especially muslim ones, to the majority the French practicing this policy. There is no remedy for the isolation of minorities other than assuring them of their rights and her presence and respect for her personality and beliefs, and helping her to integrate into the national life, which means open opportunities for the advancement of its members in the social ladder and from an increased participation in public responsibilities, respect for her privacy and spreading the values of tolerance instead of adopting such Islamic policies adopted by the extreme right, to which the dialogue of national identity has fallen victim and has become a reflection of the exclusionary and racist approach towards Islam and Muslims in the first place.

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