

## **ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN INDIAN BORDER AREAS AND BORDER MANAGEMENT**

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### **ABSTRACT**

India's regional lines, both land and ocean, experience the ill effects of assorted physical, ethnic and social inconsistencies. While the state plays a significant part in getting war boondocks, the populaces along regional peripheries, as well, can assume a significant part in getting our inclinations. Individuals living around there are the main fixing towards a protected and safe line region. This would involve reconceptualising the idea of line monitoring to powerful boundary the board, where neighborhood individuals turned into the focal point of gravity, everything being equal. The line monitoring powers need to develop available resources to standard the neighborhood populace in the administration of the line regions.

**Key Words:** National Security, Border, Border Management

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

Expanding Threats and Challenges with a landmass of sub-mainland extents, India possesses a prevalent vital situation in Southern Asia and overwhelms the northern Indian Ocean with a shore that is 7,683km long and a selective Economic Zone (EEZ) that is more than 2,000,000 square kms in size. India's territory borders surpass 15,000kms and it shares these with seven nations incorporating a little section with Afghanistan (106kms) in northern Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), presently part of the Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. The length of India's property borders with its neighbors shifts considerably: 1 Bangladesh - 4,339kms (4,351kms according to MoD2); Bhutan 605kms (700kms); China - 3,439kms (4,056kms); Myanmar - 1,425kms (1,643kms); Nepal - 1,690kms (1,751km); Pakistan - 3,325kms (3,244kms).

Because of the proclivity of India's neighbors to take advantage of India's country building troubles, the country's interior security challenges are inseparably connected with line the executives. The test of adapting to long-standing regional and limit debates with China and Pakistan, joined with permeable lines along probably the most troublesome territory on the planet, has focused on powerful and proficient boundary the executives. Notwithstanding, because of the absence of comprehension of such military issues among the dynamic tip top, India's lines keep on being monitored by countless military, paramilitary and police powers, every one of which has its own

ethos and every one of which reports to an alternate focal service at New Delhi, bringing about practically no genuine coordination in dealing with the lines.

Outer dangers to India's security are not by any means the only line the executives issue managed at present by the public safety contraption. India's pace of development has far dominated that of the greater part of its neighbors and this has produced issues like mass relocations into India. Different dangers and difficulties have likewise arisen. The line security situation is set apart by: expanded cross-line psychological oppression; invasion and ex-filtration of furnished assailants; rise of non-state entertainers; nexus between opiates dealers and arms runners; unlawful relocation; left-wing radicalism; dissenter developments helped and abetted by outside powers; and, the foundation of madras as, some of which are potential security risks.

Monitoring the Line of Actual Control with China the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China offers an illustrative illustration of the absence of coordination in line the executives. The western area of the LAC in Ladakh and Himachal Pradesh and the Middle Sector along the Uttarakhand line are monitored by some Vikas brigades of the Special Frontier Force that reports to the Cabinet Secretariat and by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) that is a Ministry of Home Affairs police power. Infantry contingents of the Indian Army man the Sikkim boundary and units of the Assam Rifles (AR) man the Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram borders. The AR is a para-military power under the Ministry of Home Affairs that is officered generally by ordinary armed force officials. Its regiments have been put under 'functional control' of neighborhood armed force arrangement officers. However the obligation is that of the military, the AR brigades given to the military for line monitoring activities are not straightforwardly under its order, a game plan that isn't helpful for cultivating an expert connection between the commandants and their subordinates.

## **2. THE WESTERN AND OTHER BORDERS**

In the west, the whole boundary with Pakistan is monitored by the BSF aside from the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The LoC is the obligation of the military with some BSF units set under its functional control. Since the LoC has been generally dynamic consistently, especially since the mid 1990s, this is a decent game plan. For more than a long time since the Kashmir struggle started in 1947-48, before long freedom, the two armed forces were occupied with a purported 'eyeball-to-eyeball' conflict with day by day death toll and property that could reasonably be known as a 'low power restricted conflict.' Since 25 November 2003, in any case, a casual truce has been set up and down the LoC, including at the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) along the Saltoro Range west of the Siachen Glacier.

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2003, in any case, a casual truce has been set up and down the LoC, including at the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) along the Saltoro Range west of the Siachen Glacier.

Along the Bangladesh line that has seen expanding activity as of late, the BSF is in control. This boundary stays in the news as there are incessant conflicts between the BSF and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR). This boundary has an impossible to miss issue that is generally alluded to as 'Areas and Adverse Possessions.' "There are 111 Indian territories (17,158 sections of land) inside Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi areas (7,110.02 sections of land) in India." Thirty-four lots of Indian land are under the unfriendly ownership of Bangladesh and 40 bits of Bangladeshi land are in India's antagonistic belonging. However the Land Border Agreement of 1974 has arrangements for the settlement of the issue of unfriendly belonging, it has not been carried out as particularly far as the issue is politically touchy. Except if the political initiative contributes time and work to determine this delicate issue, improper conflicts that do no credit to either side will proceed to happen and ruin relations between the two nations. Issues for better Border Management Ideally, line the executives ought to be the obligation of the Ministry of Home Affairs during peacetime. Nonetheless, the dynamic idea of the LoC and the need to keep up with troops near the LAC in a condition of availability for activities in high elevation regions, have constrained the military to for all time convey huge powers for this errand. While the BSF ought to be answerable for all settled boundaries, the obligation regarding disrupted and questioned borders, like the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the Indo-Tibetan line, ought to be that of the Indian Army. The guideline of 'single point control' should be kept if the lines are to be successfully overseen. Partitioned liabilities never bring about successful control. Regardless of offering the obligation to a few para-military and police powers, the military's responsibility for line the board adds up to six divisions along the LAC, the LoC and the AGPL in J&K and five divisions along the LAC and the Myanmar line in the eastern area.

This is an enormous responsibility that is expensive as far as labor just as assets, as the organization regions are for the most part in high height landscape, and should be diminished slowly. The genuine result of a rapprochement with the Chinese would be the chance of diminishing the military's arrangement on the LAC. Somewhat, the advances in observation innovation, especially satellite and elevated symbolism, can assist with keeping a consistent vigil along the LAC and make it conceivable to diminish actual arrangement as and when current reconnaissance resources can be given consistently to the developments sent forward. Also, the accessibility of a bigger number of helicopter units will improve the nature of elevated observation and the capacity to move troops to rapidly possess protective positions when it becomes essential. Be that as it may, these are both exorbitant endeavors and should be seen in the general setting of the accessibility of assets for modernization.

### **3.COORDINATING LOCAL POPULATION IN BORDER MANAGEMENT**

Individuals living in the line regions are the main fixings towards a solid and safe boundary. Town Defense and Development Committees at the base level with collaboration of the neighborhood people would go far in upgrading security and advancement of the boundaries other than giving a feeling of having a place with these individuals. There would be a necessity of preparing local people just as propelling and giving motivating forces to connecting with local people in the assignment of

line the board. Whenever this is done, they will demonstrate more than valuable instrument to oversee restricted line issues. Local people could well play out the accompanying errands by shaping Village Defense Committees (VDC) and so on:

- Reporting of any criminal operations and invasion along the boundary.
- Keeping dispensed regions under reconnaissance.
- Reporting of any strange movement particularly in rough landscape.
- Reporting of rebellious action being completed by the adversary.
- Employed in development of streets, tracks and upkeep of boundary fencing.
- In seasons of harmony also as threats, nearby populace can give important data in regards to foe develop and exercises.
- Protection of towns against crooks/dacoits and so forth from across the boundary.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

Policing in India, as an organization conveys British heritage is as yet hated and suspected by individuals. The overall inclination among the nearby populace and the neighborhood government is that, the Central power staffs are ignorant of the opinions of the nearby individuals. Accordingly, the powers are gradually separating away from neighborhood individuals and a sensation of question is developing.

The BGF should surrender the outlook that, everybody living in the line locale is a lawbreaker. They should assimilate including the neighborhood local area in line monitoring. The augmenting split among BGF and populace in lining regions is reason for worry, since compelling line monitoring is absurd without local area support. It is, hence, of central significance that, BGFs advance available resources, by which individuals foster a sensation of connection toward them. The people group should fill in as competitive edge in line the executives. When the nearby populace along the lining regions is coordinated in the standard, a specific measure of moral obligation would consequently come in. The practical 'local area's cooperation in India's line the board' can be accomplished just from that point.

As much as the security of land boundaries are necessary, so are the water boundaries. We have to manage our all security agencies for the purpose of our border security. We also understand the real meaning of National Security in those days. National Security doesn't mean the duty of only arms forces but its also duty of each and every citizen of our country.

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